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Abstract
We critically assess the representative consumer model that forms the foundation of a
well-known class of linear oligopoly demand structures. It is argued that this approach
has several limitations. We present an alternative microeconomic foundation by deriving
the same demand system directly from a population of heterogeneous buyers. Our ap-
proach can be easily adapted to different demand specifications.
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1 Introduction
A well-known way of describing the buyers’ side of an oligopoly market is through a linear
horizontally differentiated demand model. For the case of duopoly, the (direct) demand
structure generally takes the following form:
x1(p1, p2) = a1 − b1 · p1 + c · p2,
x2(p1, p2) = a2 − b2 · p2 + c · p1,
where price and quantity are positive and respectively given by pi and xi, for i = 1, 2.
1 It
is, moreover, commonly assumed that ai, bi, c > 0 and bi > c, for i = 1, 2, so that a firm’s
demand depends negatively on its own price, positively on the rival’s price and own effects
dominate cross effects. This demand system can be roughly interpreted as follows. If, say,
firm 1 raises its price slightly, then ceteris paribus some of its customers walk away and either
go home or visit firm 2 instead. Likewise, lowering price attracts additional buyers, some of
whom switch from the competing firm.
The traditional foundation for this demand specification does not come from a group of
heterogeneous buyers, however, but from a representative consumer who on behalf of an
unspecified buyer population maximizes a quadratic aggregate welfare function. The most
popular variations of this type are due to Bowley (1924) and Shubik and Levitan (1980).2
In the field of macroeconomics, such a representative agent approach has been heavily criti-
cized by many. One reason for this is that transforming individual preferences into represen-
tative aggregate preferences often proves problematic. It is, for instance, quite possible that
the representative agent prefers A to B, whereas each and every represented buyer prefers B
to A.3 For this and other reasons, many macroeconomists are reluctant to take this approach
and some even went as far as to effectively compose a requiem for the representative con-
sumer.4 This is in stark contrast to the fields of microeconomics and industrial organization,
where the use of such a fictitious agent is widely accepted. What makes this particularly
1See, for instance, Singh and Vives (1984). This setting can be easily generalized to an n-firm variant. See,
for example, Ha¨ckner (2000).
2See Martin (2002) for a detailed discussion of both these models.
3This Pareto inconsistency has been clearly established by Jerison (1984). See also Dow and da Costa
Werlang (1988).
4See, for example, Kirman (1992).
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surprising is that a rationale for this approach is commonly missing.5
In this paper, we have two main goals. The first is to provide a critical assessment of the
representative consumer as a foundation for the above linear demand structure. Specifically,
we argue that it is both inaccurate and inadequate. It is inaccurate as the representative
agent’s aggregate utility function has no (clear) connection with the objectives of those rep-
resented.6 It is inadequate because a justification for both the utility specification and the
solution approach is missing. Taken together, this leads us to conclude that the popular linear
oligopoly demand structure lacks a proper foundation.
We then proceed with our second goal, which is to argue that quadratic representative con-
sumer models are effectively redundant. We do so by showing that the same demand structure
can be easily derived directly from a population of heterogeneous consumers. A main advan-
tage of this approach is that it is explicitly based on simple buyer behavior at the micro-level
and therefore has a natural interpretation.
A couple of recent papers have raised some red flags regarding the use of a representative
agent with a quadratic utility function. Kopel, Ressi and Lambertini (2017), for instance, show
that seemingly similar quadratic aggregate utility functions may give rise to fundamentally
different demand systems. In turn, this might lead to radically different policy implications.
Amir, Erickson and Jin (2017) provide a thorough study of several characteristics of the
quadratic utility specification. Among other things, they establish that strict concavity of
the utility function is a necessary condition for the corresponding demand system to be well-
defined.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the quadratic
representative consumer utility function and highlights several problematic features of this
specification. Section 3 presents a microfoundation for linear oligopoly demand. Section 4
concludes.
5As a telling example, both Bowley (1924) and Shubik and Levitan (1980) introduce this approach as
an illustration and do not provide an explanation or justification for the specification of their representative
consumer’s utility function.
6The exception here would be when the population of represented buyers is assumed to all possess the
same utility function. Yet, in that particular case it is not clear what exactly would be the added value of a
representative agent.
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2 Quadratic Representative Consumer Models
In this section, we express some concerns about the above mentioned class of quadratic
representative consumer models. Specifically, we raise several issues regarding the shape of
the objective function, the derivation of the corresponding demand functions and the relation
between the products involved.
2.1 Issue 1: the Objective
Both the Bowley (1924) and the Shubik-Levitan (1980) demand specifications are derived
from a representative consumer gross utility function that takes the following general form:
U(x1, x2) = α · (x1 + x2)− β · (x1 + x2)2 − γ · (x2 − x1)2,
with α, β, γ > 0.7 Notice that the way in which we present the objective function, it effectively
consists of three distinct parts. Starting with the third, γ · (x2 − x1)2, this part captures the
complementarity between both products. Consistent with classic consumer theory, utility is
ceteris paribus higher with a more balanced consumption plan. In fact, the representative
agent is induced to buy both products in equal amounts (x1 = x2) so that the third-term
disutility is minimized and de facto disappears.
The first two parts, α · (x1 +x2)−β · (x1 +x2)2, capture utility coming from total rather than
relative consumption and express the extent to which the goods are considered substitutes.
These components indicate that the consumer derives utility from consuming more products,
but only up to a certain amount. That is, utility increases at low levels of total consumption
through the first term, but at higher levels of total consumption the second term starts to
dominate the first. This implies that there is a point at which the consumer is satiated. Notice
that this holds even when the representative consumer would not face a budget constraint.
Contrary to the third term favoring balance in consumption, this therefore is at odds with
traditional consumer theory.8 Indeed, the fact that the objective function has a unique
maximum makes that the common assumption of nonsatiation is violated.
7See Bowley (1924, p.56) and Shubik and Levitan (1980, p.69).
8See, for instance, Chapter 1 of Jehle and Reny (2001) for a detailed discussion of classic consumer theory.
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2.2 Issue 2: the Solution
To solve the representative consumer problem, one naturally needs to take account of the cost
of consumption. In the following, we point out that the linear oligopoly demand structure
will only result from the representative agent’s maximization problem under fairly specific,
and arguably strong, assumptions.
Towards that end, let F be a set of vectors (x,m) ∈ Rn ×R and consider the utility function
V : F 7→ R. For (x,m) ∈ F , therefore, utility V (x,m) is obtained from consuming an amount
of x ∈ Rn goods as well as from the unspent money m. Moreover, let the vector of prices be
given by p ∈ Rn. If the available income is I ≥ 0, then the representative consumer faces the
following general maximization problem:
max
x∈F
V (x,m)
s.t.: m = I − p · x,
m ≥ 0,
where p · x is total expenditure.
It can be easily verified, however, that the linear oligopoly demand system is the solution to:
max
x∈F
U(x) +m
s.t.: m = I − p · x.
Thus, in light of the general maximization problem, V (x,m) = U(x) +m and the constraint
m ≥ 0 is ignored. Observe that this specification effectively treats expenditures as a disutility,
which is linearly subtracted from the gross utility function. At first sight this may seem natural
and innocuous, but it does imply two strong assumptions:
[A1] The representative consumer’s utility function is quasi-linear in money;
[A2] The representative consumer can borrow unlimited amounts of money for free.
The first condition means the absence of a wealth effect as utility is linearly increasing in
money. Irrespective of whether utility is high or low, the marginal gain of an extra dollar is
the same. The second states that the budget restriction has no bite and is effectively non-
existent. Indeed, this approach implies that the budget constraint is never binding even when
the representative consumer would have no income at all.9
9Amir, Erickson and Jin (2017) point out that the representative consumer’s budget should be sufficiently
high for an interior solution in which income effects are absent, which is an alternative interpretation of A2.
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2.3 Issue 3: the Products
Following the textbook approach and thus assuming A1 and A2, the representative consumer
picks x1 and x2 to maximize:
V (x1, x2) = α · (x1 + x2)− β · (x1 + x2)2 − γ · (x2 − x1)2 + I − p1 · x1 − p2 · x2,
which gives
x1 =
α
4β
− ( 1
8β
+
1
8γ
) · p1 + ( 1
8γ
− 1
8β
) · p2,
x2 =
α
4β
− ( 1
8β
+
1
8γ
) · p2 + ( 1
8γ
− 1
8β
) · p1.
Goods are substitutes in price when x1(p1, p2) is increasing in p2 and x2(p1, p2) is increasing
in p1. Notice that this is the case precisely when
1
8γ >
1
8β , which is equivalent to γ < β.
Goods are substitutes in utility when for every η1 > 0 there is an η2 > 0 such that:
U(x1 − η1, x2 + η2) = U(x1, x2).
That is, every decrease in utility resulting from a reduction in the consumption of good 1 can
be compensated by an increase in the consumption of good 2.10 If we consider x2 an implicit
function X2(x1), then X
′
2 < 0. Implicit differentiation yields:
α · (1 +X ′2)− 2β · (x1 +X2) · (1 +X ′2)− 2γ · (x1 −X2) · (1−X ′2) = 0.
Rearranging gives:
X ′2(x1) =
2γ · (x1 − x2) + 2β · (x1 + x2)− α
2γ · (x1 − x2)− 2β · (x1 + x2) + α.
Thus, X ′2 < 0 requires
2γ · (x1 − x2) + 2β · (x1 + x2)− α < 0 =⇒ (β + γ) · x1 + (β − γ) · x2 < α
2
and
2γ · (x1 − x2)− 2β · (x1 + x2) + α > 0 =⇒ (β + γ) · x2 + (β − γ) · x1 < α
2
or the reverse.
10It is noteworthy that there is an alternative interpretation of substitution in utility in the literature that
dates back as far as Edgeworth (1881). In that case, two goods, x and y, are considered substitutes in utility
when ∂2U/∂x∂y < 0 and ∂2U/∂y∂x < 0. It can be easily verified that when both goods are substitutes in
utility according to this definition, then they are indeed also substitutes in price and vice versa.
6
Note that the above inequalities do not hold for all consumption bundles (x1, x2). For in-
stance, x1 = 0, x2 = 1 and β − γ < α2 < β + γ violates the inequalities. In this model,
therefore, products are never pure substitutes or complements. In particular, there is always
a combination (x1, x2) for which x1 and x2 are complements in utility and substitutes in
price.11
This is a remarkable result in that one would expect a clear connection between the properties
of the utility function and the properties of the corresponding demand structure. This lim-
ited explanatory power is particularly problematic since the representative consumer’s utility
function is ultimately intended to serve as a microfoundation for linear oligopoly demand.
3 A Microeconomic foundation for Linear Oligopoly Demand
In the previous section, we have highlighted some problematic features of quadratic represen-
tative consumer models. We now proceed by presenting an alternative microfoundation for
the linear oligopoly demand structure as described above:
x1(p1, p2) = a1 − b1 · p1 + c · p2,
x2(p1, p2) = a2 − b2 · p2 + c · p1.
Specifically, we will show in the following how this demand system can be derived directly
from a population of heterogeneous consumers.
To begin, consider a price-setting duopoly where both firms are located on the boundary of an
interval [0, 2]. In particular, and without loss of generality, firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively
situated at 0 and 2. There are three types of consumers, each with uniform population density
λi on [0, 2], i = 1, 2, 3. The total number of type i buyers is thus given by 2 · λi. Type 1
customers are assumed to obtain positive gross utility when buying from firm 1, s > 0, and
no utility when buying from firm 2. By contrast, Type 2 customers attach no value to the
products of firm 1 and derive positive gross utility from buying at firm 2, v > 0. Finally, Type
3 customers value both equally and have a willingness to pay of 4 for each.12 Consumers buy
11Indeed, it can be easily verified that the level curves are ellipses. To illustrate, let α = 4 and β = γ
be (approximately) equal to 1 so that U = 2 − (x1 − 1)2 − (x2 − 1)2. At U = 1, the indifference curve is
therefore a circle with center (x1, x2) = (1, 1) and radius 1. The goods are then complements at (x1, x2) =
(1 + 1
2
√
2, 1− 1
2
√
2), for example.
12As an illustrative interpretation, one may view both firms as competing ice cream vendors where firm
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no more than one unit of the product and are characterized by their location. In the spirit
of spatial IO settings, there are costs associated with distance between buyer and seller and
these are assumed to be linearly increasing.
Let us now specify the utility function of a Type 1 consumer located at z ∈ [0, 2]. This
customer has basically three options: (1) buy from firm 1 (value s − z − p1), (2) buy from
firm 2 (value z− 2− p2) or (3) buy nothing (value 0). Notice that the third choice dominates
the second, because z − 2− p2 ≤ 0 for positive prices. Thus, the utility function of a Type 1
buyer located at z ∈ [0, 2] effectively is
u1(p1, p2, z) = max{s− z − p1, 0}.
The Type 1 customer who is indifferent between option (1) and option (3) is located at
z = s− p1.
The utility function of a Type 2 customer located at z ∈ [0, 2] can be determined in a similar
fashion and is given by
u2(p1, p2, z) = max{v − 2 + z − p2, 0}.
The Type 2 customer who is indifferent between buying and not buying is thus located at
z = p2 − v + 2. Finally, the utility function of a Type 3 customer at z ∈ [0, 2] is
u3(p1, p2, z) = max{4− z − p1, 2 + z − p2, 0}.
Under the assumption that prices are sufficiently low, the indifferent Type 3 buyer is located
at z = 1 + 12(p2 − p1).13
On the basis of these utility specifications, we can now derive the corresponding demand
functions. For a given combination of prices (p1, p2) in the relevant range, demand for firm
1 is given by the sum of consuming Type 1 buyers and the part of Type 3 buyers preferring
the product of firm 1.14
x1(p1, p2) = λ1 · (s− p1) + λ3 · (1 + 1
2
(p2 − p1))
1 sells strawberry flavor and firm 2 sells vanilla ice. Type 1 buyers are then those customers who only like
strawberry ice, for example, whereas Type 2 buyers exclusively prefer vanilla. Type 3 customers consider both
and let their buying decision depend on the prices set.
13A sufficient condition to ensure that all Type 3 consumers buy a product is p1, p2 ≤ 2.
14Indifferent Type 1 and Type 2 customers are located in the interval [0, 2] when s − 2 ≤ p1 ≤ s and
v − 2 ≤ p2 ≤ v. Type 3 customers prefer to buy a product when p1 + p2 ≤ 6.
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= s · λ1 + λ3 − (λ1 + 1
2
λ3) · p1 + 1
2
λ3 · p2.
Demand for the products of firm 2 can be derived in a similar way.
x2(p1, p2) = v · λ2 + λ3 − (λ2 + 1
2
λ3) · p2 + 1
2
λ3 · p1.
The above approach therefore allows one to derive any linear oligopoly demand structure of
the form:
x1(p1, p2) = a1 − b1 · p1 + c · p2,
x2(p1, p2) = a2 − b2 · p2 + c · p1,
where λ1 = b1 − c, λ2 = b2 − c, λ3 = 2c, s = a1−2cb1−c and v = a2−2cb2−c .
4 Concluding Remarks
The use of representative agents in economic theory dates back at least as far as the late
1800s when Marshall’s manuscript Principles of Economics saw the light of day.15 Marshall
introduced the notion of a ‘representative firm’, but also considered employing this approach
in other areas of economics.16 In fact, he is claimed to have said:17
“I think the notion of ‘representative firm’ is capable of extension to labour;
and I have had some idea of introducing that into my discussion of standard rates
of wages. But I don’t feel sure I shall: and I almost think I can say what I
want to more simply in another way..”
In this paper, we have shown this hunch might hold true for a well-known class of quadratic
representative consumer models. Indeed, one can quite simply derive the corresponding linear
oligopoly demand structure directly from a population of heterogeneous buyers. This ren-
ders the use of a fictitious agent in this case effectively redundant. Moreover, the resulting
microeconomic foundation can be easily extended to other demand specifications.
It is, however, not only for the sake of simplicity that one should pass by this representative
buyer model. In line with other recent work discussed above, we have pointed out some
15The first edition of this work was published in 1890. A flavour of the representative agent approach can
also be found in Edgeworth (1925, an English translation of an Italian version from 1897).
16A detailed discussion is provided by Hartley (1996).
17See Pigou (1956, p. 437). Bold emphasis is ours.
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problematic traits of this approach. In particular, we have argued that it is inaccurate as
the representative agent’s aggregate utility function has no clear connection with the repre-
sented buyers’ objectives and that it is inadequate as it requires an unsatisfactory solution
approach to obtain the linear oligopoly demand system. Moreover, it is quite possible that
substitutability in prices embedded in the demand structure corresponds to products that the
representative consumer considers complements. Together, this should raise strong doubts
about welfare analyses based on this type of representative consumer models. It also naturally
warrants critical assessment of other settings with a similar approach (e.g., constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) models).18 We leave this issue for future research.
18For this type of representative consumer model, see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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